tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3711403820684618858.post899565787440232137..comments2021-11-03T07:51:41.080-07:00Comments on Juridical Coherence: 14.0 Why do what you "ought"?—A habit theory of explicit moralityStephen R. Diamondhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07165258952900481659noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3711403820684618858.post-51342284471192071982013-01-20T16:30:37.449-08:002013-01-20T16:30:37.449-08:00You're correct that the arguments don't ad...You're correct that the arguments don't address various moral-realist positions. The direct argument pertains to an issue among error theorists, and even there, the intent isn't to answer opposing arguments but to present a novel error theory. The leading error theories treat objective morality as an empirical falsehood; my alternative is that morality involves a type of conceptual error, a category error, by which the logical status of "principles of integrity" is misapprehended.<br /><br />This can influence moral realists only to the extent that a better error theory makes antirealism more attractive.Stephen R. Diamondhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07165258952900481659noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3711403820684618858.post-55948802478658697292013-01-18T21:43:36.958-08:002013-01-18T21:43:36.958-08:00It seems like your argument is based upon a lot of...It seems like your argument is based upon a lot of assumptions and unjustified theories/arguments, such as Moore's Open-Question argument. You seem to reject the notion of an objective morality before you even begin the article, and as such you never actually defend that moral viewpoint. Additionally, you seem assume that directive functions can only be related to self-interest, while in fact there are many other ways to explain a directive morality. One such example is the Kantian Constitutivism endorsed by Christine Korsgaard, which is based upon the very notion of the will - whether or not that will is empirically unconstrained. As such, one could not justifiably have a reason or make a choice against this moral code, rather to act badly would be to perform the act of choosing in a bad way. You also make a huge jump from a directive moral code to an evolutionary, habit-based one. You also seem to exclude more mainstream forms of deontology, particularly the self-legislating will of Kant. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com