tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3711403820684618858.post9925923345950264..comments2021-11-03T07:51:41.080-07:00Comments on Juridical Coherence: 10.1. The what, how, and why of "free will": A metaphysical digression—Part 1. What is "free will"?Stephen R. Diamondhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07165258952900481659noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3711403820684618858.post-85269080558975716122016-07-19T07:01:50.730-07:002016-07-19T07:01:50.730-07:00You are misarticulating an actual intuition. The a...You are misarticulating an actual intuition. The actual intuition is true, and the misarticulation is false, so in that sense you rightly deny it.<br /><br />We do not have an intuition that conscious deciding as such (namely as conscious) is the cause of our actions. We have an intuition that we can be conscious of deciding, and that our deciding is the cause of our actions. But this is like subjectively feeling hunger and concluding that we have the desire to eat. When we go and eat, the subjective feeling is not the cause of our action, but rather our desire to eat is the cause. But the subjective feeling is indeed how we know that we have the desire.<br /><br />In the same way, conscious deciding is how we know that we are making a decision, and the decision is the cause of our action.<br /><br />In that way, our intuition is true, but your misarticulation of it is false, as you say.entirelyuselesshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12422102436356978880noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3711403820684618858.post-2387152001043593962016-07-17T13:13:17.335-07:002016-07-17T13:13:17.335-07:00To put this in context, you disagree with the defi...To put this in context, you disagree with the definition. You maintain "Conscious volition is not the same as free will." (Overcoming Bias comments.)<br /><br />The definition is an attempt to articulate an intuition. "Free will" has multiple senses. My problem is to articulate the sense that should be denied. To say that isn't the sense you care about isn't a substantive disagreement. On the other hand, you might be saying that I misarticulate an actual intuition, or there is no corresponding intuition there at all, that there is no sense in which we seem free but are not - ultimately an empirical question, but I'm betting that people overwhelmingly would assent to having this intuition of freedom.Stephen R. Diamondhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07165258952900481659noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3711403820684618858.post-4757827730076685832016-07-17T00:14:41.719-07:002016-07-17T00:14:41.719-07:00You are offering a theory under the guise of a def...You are offering a theory under the guise of a definition 1Zhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15540342141981143876noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3711403820684618858.post-29946648061959133912012-10-19T13:15:21.466-07:002012-10-19T13:15:21.466-07:00If your point is an empirical critique of Libet, i...If your point is an empirical critique of Libet, in 10.2 "How free will?" ( http://tinyurl.com/2uy5oyg ), I contend that my argument depends on Libet's conceptualization rather than his empirical findings.Stephen R. Diamondhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07165258952900481659noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3711403820684618858.post-52624932326241334982012-10-15T07:15:12.830-07:002012-10-15T07:15:12.830-07:00This is a bit premature. You need to check out Den...This is a bit premature. You need to check out Dennet's reponse to Libet.<br /><br />http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_Evolves#Libet.27s_experiments1Zhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15540342141981143876noreply@blogger.com